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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Amu SS 78-2-2(3)(a) and (j) and 78-2-2(5) (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was Kelley required to tender his performance on 
September 22, 1987? 
2. Did Kelley improperly impose conditions on his 
tender, thereby rendering it defective? 
3. Was Kelley's tender of performance excused? 
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding as a 
matter of law that Kelley's remedies were limited to a return 
of his earnest money deposit or a waiver of any title defects? 
5. Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding as a 
matter of law that Kelley refused to waive any defects? 
6* Did the Court of Appeals err in remanding the 
case for entry of judgment? 
Issues 1 through 3 relate to the propriety of the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment. In determining whether the 
trial court correctly granted summary judgment, the Court resolves 
only legal issues and does not defer to the trial court. It 
determines only whether the trial court correctly held that there 
were no disputed issues of material fact and whether the court 
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erred in applying the governing law. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1989) . 
The remaining issues (issues 4 through 6) present ques-
tions of law. This Court reviews the lower court's rulings for 
correctness and accords them no particular deference. See, e.g., 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp,, 752 P.2d 884, 
887 (Utah 1988); Provo Citv Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 
803, 805 (Utah 1979). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Kelley brought this action seeking a declaratory judg-
ment as to the parties' respective rights and obligations under 
an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the sale of real property, 
between Kelley as buyer and First Security Mortgage Company as 
seller, and seeking specific performance of the agreement. The 
complaint also sought damages for First Security's alleged breach 
of the agreement. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Kelley filed this action on September 22, 1987. First 
Security filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and Kelley filed 
a motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court denied 
First Security's motion to dismiss and granted Kelley summary 
judgment ordering First Security to convey the property to Kelley. 
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(A copy of the Partial Summary Judgment is included in the Adden-
dum as exhibit A.) The court reserved the question of whether 
Kelley was entitled to an abatement of the purchase price or 
damagesc The parties then settled the damage issue, and a final 
judgment was entered on May 6, 1988. (A copy of the Final Judg-
ment and Decree of Specific Performance is included in the Adden-
dum as exhibit Be) First Security conveyed the property to 
Kelley, and Kelley and his family have occupied the property 
since then* 
On June 3, 1988, Leucadia was substituted as defendant 
for First Security and filed this appeal. On January 5, 1990, 
the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment 
and remanded the case for entry of judgment consistent with its 
opinion. (A copy of the Court of Appeals' Opinion is included 
in the Addendum as exhibit C.) Kelley's petition for rehearing 
was denied on February 16, 1990. On April 23, 1990, Kelley peti-
tioned this court for a writ of certiorari. The Dtah Association 
of Realtors and the Division of Real Estate of the Department 
of Commerce of the State of Utah sought leave to file amicus 
curiae briefs in support of Kelley's petition. This Court granted 
the amici leave to file briefs, and, on August 22, 1990, after 
the briefing was completed, the Court granted Kelley's petition. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
1. On or about March 2, 1987, Kelley, a resident of 
Massachusetts, entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
(the "Agreement") with First Security Mortgage Company, as seller, 
for the purchase of residential property in Park City, Utah (the 
"Property"). Record [hereinafter "R."] 14-22. Under the Agree-
ment, the seller agreed "to furnish good and marketable title to 
the property," subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted in 
the Agreement and evidenced by a current policy of title 
insurance. R. 16 I 3. Title was to be conveyed by special war-
ranty deed. R. 16. The seller was also to provide a current 
survey. R. 18. The seller bore all risk of loss or damage to 
the property, by vandalism or other means, until closing. R. 
17 5 P. The closing was to be on or before April 20, 1987. R. 
18.1 
2. In reliance on the Agreement, Kelley paid the 
$10,000 earnest money and began arranging the funds necessary 
to complete the sale by liquidating assets. R. 276 f 3. 
3. At the time the Agreement was signed, both Kelley 
and First Security understood the Property to consist of a resi-
dence surrounded by approximately 12 3/4 acres of grounds. The 
grounds are substantially enclosed by fences, a spring and a 
stream. The home is situated on the edge of the stream, which 
1 Other provisions of the Agreement are discussed infra. 
- 4 -
feeds the pond and irrigates the pastures located on the Property. 
Rc 190-92, 194-95, 207-08, 258-59, 276. 
4. Shortly after the Agreement was signed, First 
Security, in accordance with the Agreement, had the Property sur-
veyed. The survey revealed that the quitclaim deed by which 
First Security acquired its interest contained an erroneous prop-
erty description that placed the boundaries 15.22 feet farther 
south than the boundaries of the property that First Security 
and its predecessors occupied and intended to convey. R. 25-
27, 29-30. 
5. After the Agreement was executed, the adjacent pro-
perty owners, the Armstrongs, cut off the water to the pond, 
removed a pipe on the property that carried water from the spring 
to the pond and removed fish from the pond. R. 45, 50-53. Con-
sequently, the pond dried up. 
6. First Security believed that the boundary and 
water problems affected not only the value of the Property, but 
also its ability to convey marketable title. See R. 29-30, 50-
51. 
7. To give it time to resolve these problems, on April 
22, 1987—two days after the scheduled closing date—First 
Security requested that the closing date be extended to June 1, 
1987. Kelley agreed to the request. R. 19, 277 I 8, 289 I 4. 
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8. On May 28, 1987, First Security again requested 
that the closing date be extended, to July 1, 1987. Kelley agreed 
to the request. R. 20, 277 5 8, 289 1 4. 
9. On July 6, 1987—five days after the latest sched-
uled closing date—First Security again requested that the closing 
date be extended, this time to August 31, 1987. Kelley agreed 
to the request. R. 21, 277 * 8, 289 I 4. 
10. First Security was unable to resolve the boundary 
and water problems with the Armstrongs informally, so it filed 
a Complaint against the Armstrongs in the Third Judicial District 
Court, seeking a declaration of rights, an order quieting title 
to the Property in First Security, and damages resulting from 
drainage of the trout pond* See R. 23-59. In its Amended Com-
plaint, First Security claimed that because of the erroneous 
legal description it could not convey marketable title to the 
Property and that the Property's value had been substantially 
reduced because of the loss of the stream, spring and trout pond. 
R. 29-31, 50-52. 
11. Throughout this period, First Security told Kelley 
that it would get the boundary and water problems cleared up and 
that it was not necessary for him to retain counsel. R. 289 1 
4. 
12. In late August or early September 1987, Leucadia 
expressed an interest in purchasing the Property directly from 
First Security. By selling the Property directly to Leucadia, 
First Security could avoid paying a $45,000 real estate commis-
sion, could negotiate its way out of the Armstrong lawsuit and 
obtain a higher, cash purchase price for the Property. See R. 
493, 505-07, 510-14. 
13. On September 4, 1987, First Security's attorney 
sent a letter to Kelley demanding that the sale close by September 
15, 1987, or First Security would consider the Agreement to have 
terminated. The letter stated in pertinent part: 
First Security is prepared to sell the 
property to you "'as is' without warranty" 
in accordance with the terms of the earnest 
money agreement. First Security is also 
prepared to assign you its rights in the 
lawsuit against the Armstrongs. Absent any 
obligation to the contrary or reimbursement 
from you for its legal costs and fees, First 
Security is no longer desirous of pursuing 
the lawsuit with the Armstrongs. First Secur-
ity has not pursued the legal action against 
the Armstrongs as a result of any legal ob-
ligation, but simply because of its interest 
in closing the deal with you. First Security 
has never viewed itself as having the obli-
gation to clear title, nor does the earnest 
money agreement provide for that obligation. 
Accordingly, as indicated above, First Secur-
ity will sell the property in accordance 
with the terms of the earnest money agreement, 
as extended by this letter to September 15th. 
Otherwise, . . . First Security will return 
the $10,000.00 earnest money deposited in 
escrow to you and pursue other alternatives. 
I am aware that you have some questions 
regarding the legal issues of the lawsuit 
and strongly encourage you to obtain legal 
counsel to advise you concerning those issues. 
I will be happy to cooperate with whomever 
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you select as counsel in order that you can 
make a fully informed judgment. . . . If I 
do not hear from you or a representative by 
the close of business on September 15th, I 
will consider the agreement as having expired 
and will have the funds in escrow returned 
to you. 
Re 114-15 (emphasis added). This was the first time that First 
Security had told Kelley that he needed legal counsel. R. 289 
5 4. 
14. The September 4 letter was sent over the Labor Day 
weekend, and Kelley did not receive it until September 8, 1987. 
R. 277-78 1 9, 289 f 4, 294. 
15. Kelley subsequently retained counsel and sent a 
mailgram to First Security stating that he would not walk away 
from the Property and that he needed the customary 30-day exten-
sion before he could close. R. 278, 288-89, 294. 
16. Kelley's Utah counsel immediately contacted First 
Security's counsel. First Security agreed to provide all the 
documents concerning the boundary and water problems for review 
so that Kelley could make an informed decision regarding the 
Property. See R. 115. An appointment was made for the production 
of those documents, but counsel for First Security failed to 
keep the appointment or to make the records available for review. 
R. 282-83. 
17. On September 14, 1987, counsel for First Security 
extended the deadline for closing to September 22, 1987. R. 
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116. The requested documents were not provided by that date. 
In fact, First Security's counsel did not give Kelley all the 
documents he needed to review the boundary and water problems 
until October 15, 1987. R. 283* 
18. On September 22, 1987, Kelley's attorney wrote 
First Security's attorney to inform him that Kelley was ready, 
willing and able to close the Agreement, that the funds necessary 
for the down payment were on deposit with Williamsburg Savings 
Bank and that he expected First Security to perform as agreed. 
R. 119-21. 
19. On September 22, 1987, this action was filed, 
seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties pursuant to 
the Agreement and a decree of specific performance requiring 
First Security to convey the Property to Kelley pursuant to the 
Agreement, as interpreted by the court. Kelley also sought 
damages for First Security's alleged breach of contract and in-
terference with Kelley's performance. R. 1-11. The escrow funds 
were subsequently deposited with the Summit County Clerk. R. 
68-70. 
20. On September 22, 1987, First Security declared the 
Agreement null and void and, on September 24, 1987, executed the 
release of Kelley's $10,000 earnest money deposit. R. 123-25. 
Kelley refused to accept the release. See R. 149, 155. 
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21* On September 25, 1987, Leucadia formally offered 
to purchase the Property from First Security.2 R# 493. 
22. On November 10, 1987, First Security moved to 
dismiss Kelley's complaint. R. 72-73. Kelley responded by filing 
a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking an order requiring 
First Security to allow him to close on the property and reserving 
any damage claims Kelley might have against First Security. R. 
137-39. 
23. On January 10, 1988, the trial court granted 
Kelley's motion for partial summary judgment and ordered First 
Security to convey the Property to Kelley. The court retained 
jurisdiction over Kelley's claim to an abatement of the purchase 
price, damages and attorneys' fees. The conveyance was ordered 
to occur when final judgment was entered in this action. R. 
562-64. 
24. On May 6, 1988, a final judgment was entered. R. 
815-24. First Security accepted the monies deposited with the 
court and conveyed the Property that it owned to Kelley by special 
warranty deed and the 15.22 foot discrepancy caused by the er-
roneous legal description by quitclaim deed. See Brief of Respon-
dent app. A. 
* The earnest money agreement between Leucadia and First 
Security, as amended, provided that First Security would indemnify 
Leucadia for any losses it sustained as a result of this action. 
R. 510-14. 
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25. On June 3, 1988, Leucadia was substituted as 
defendant in this action and filed this appeal. R. 844-46, 847-
49. 
26. On appeal, the parties both stated that the issue 
was the timeliness and sufficiency of Kelley's tender of per-
formance. See Brief of Appellant at 1; Brief of Respondent at 
2. The Court of Appeals, however, stated the issues as (1) 
whether the Agreement provided remedies to Kelley if the defendant 
was unable to convey marketable title, and (2) whether those reme-
dies required the defendant to convey the property if title was 
not marketable. Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., No. 880534-CA, 
slip op. at 1 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 5, 19S0) [hereinafter slip, 
op.]. 
27. The Court of Appeals' opinion focused on paragraph 
H of the Agreement (mistakenly referred to as paragraph 4), a 
provision never addressed in the trial court or in the appeal 
briefs. Paragraph H provided as follows: 
If title insurance is elected, Seller author-
izes the Listing Brokerage to order a pre-
liminary commitment for a standard form 
ALTA policy of title insurance to be issued 
by such title insurance company as Seller 
shall designate. Title policy to be issued 
shall contain no exceptions other than those 
provided for in said standard form, and the 
encumbrances or defects excepted under the 
final contract of sale. If title cannot be 
made so insurable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless 
Buyer elects to waive such defects or en-
- 11 -
cumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this 
Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. 
Ro 15o3 
28. The Court of Appeals concluded, first, that 
"[t]itle could not be made insurable without exceptions for 
defects," and, second, that "Kelley refused to waive the defects." 
Therefore, the court held, Kelley's remedy under paragraph H "was 
limited to a refund of his earnest money deposit, not specific 
performance." Slip. op. at 3. 
29. With Judge Bench dissenting, the court reversed 
the trial court's judgment and remanded the case "for entry of 
judgment consistent with this opinion." Slip op. at 4. 
* The court also looked at paragraph G of the Agreement 
which stated in pertinent part: 
e . . Seller shall be required, through escrow 
at closing, to cure the [title] defect(s) to 
which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) 
is not curable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, this Agreement shall be null and 
void at the option of the Buyer, and all 
monies received herewith shall be returned 
to the respective parties. 
R. at 15. Paragraph G, unlike paragraph H, does not expressly 
require the buyer to waive any title defect. It merely gives the 
buyer the option of terminating the Agreement. As the court 
correctly noted, "Kelley refused to accept this option." Slip 
op. at 3. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First Security argued in the trial court (and the Court 
of Appeals apparently agreed) that Kelley lost whatever rights 
he had under the Agreement by not closing on September 22, 1987, 
as First Security demanded. But Kelley was entitled to a reason-
able time after First Security gave notice of its intention to 
close, and the evidence was undisputed that September 22, 1987, 
was not a reasonable time under the circumstances. Therefore, 
Kelley did not lose any rights on September 22, 1987. (Point I.) 
First Security also argued that Kelley lost his rights 
under the Agreement because his tender was conditional. Not 
only was Kelley's tender unconditional (point II), but in fact 
his tender was excused (point III). It was First Security who 
made a defective tender by conditioning its offer to close on 
Kelley's waiver of his rights under the Agreement. First Secu-
rity also committed an anticipatory breach of the Agreement by 
repudiating its obligations under the Agreement, further excu-
sing Kelley's tender of performance. Because Kelleyfs tender 
was not defective and in fact was not even required, Kelley was 
entitled to specifically enforce the Agreement. 
The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that paragraph 
H of the Agreement limited Kelley's remedy to a return of his 
earnest money. The Court of Appeals' decision was based on facts 
that were not developed in the trial court and not of record. 
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Moreover, the facts that were of record did not support the 
court's factual findings. (Point IV.) 
More important, the Court of Appeals erred in conclud-
ing, as a matter of law, that Kelley was required to waive any 
title defect and in fact refused to waive any defect. Kelley 
was not required to waive defects under paragraph H because there 
was no evidence that the conditions precedent to the remedy pro-
visions of paragraph H had been met. But even if Kelley were 
required to waive title defects, as a matter of law he must be 
deemed to have done so since, by filing this action, Kelley 
elected to enforce the Agreement according to its terms. (Point 
V.) 
Finally, the Court of Appeals erred in remanding the 
case for entry of judgment. (Point VI.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
KELLEY WAS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE TIME TO CLOSE, 
AND THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT HE TOOK 
APPROPRIATE ACTION WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. 
Kelley brought this action asking the court to declare 
the parties' respective rights and obligations tinder the Agreement 
and to enforce the Agreement. See R. 1-11. In the trial court 
First Security argued that Kelley was not entitled to specific 
performance because the Agreement expired on September 22, 1987, 
and Kelley failed to make a proper tender of performance by that 
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date. See R. 87.4 The trial court properly rejected this 
argument. The Court of Appeals, however, did not expressly deal 
with the issue of tender because it found that Kelley's only 
remedy under the Agreement was to waive any defect or to terminate 
the Agreement and, it found, Kelley had refused to waive any 
defect. It apparently based its conclusion on a tender letter 
from Kelley's counsel and his filing of this action, both of which 
occurred on September 22, 1987. See infra point IV.B. 
The defendant's and the Court of Appeals' analyses both 
proceed from the same false premise, namely, that Kelley's duty 
of performance under the Agreement arose before he filed this 
action and paid his money into court. If Kelley's duty to perform 
had not arisen at that time, then he had no duty to tender before, 
and any alleged defect in his tender of September 22, 1987, was 
therefore irrelevant. Similarly, if Kelley's duty to perform 
had not arisen, then he was not yet required to choose between 
waiving any alleged defect or walking away from the deal. Kel-
ley' s duty to perform did not arise before he filed this action 
and paid his money into court, and, by doing so, he preserved 
the status quo until the court could resolve the parties' respec-
tive claims. 
%
 On appeal, Leucadia also argued that Kelley lost his 
right to specific performance because he did not make an uncon-
ditional tender of performance on or before September 22, 1987• 
Brief of Appellant at 18. 
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Where a contract sets the time for performance, that 
is when the duty to perform arises. In this case, the Agreement 
initially called for a closing on or before April 20, 1987. R. 
18. However, the parties had continually extended the closing 
date by agreement and, by their conduct, had waived any provision 
that time was of the essence. See R. 19-21. In such a case, 
the contractual obligations can continue beyond the closing date. 
Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Investment Inc. v. Webb, 
645 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1982). During this executory period of 
the contract, neither party was in default, and neither party's 
duty of performance arose until the other party tendered perfor-
mance. Id. at 55-56. First Security could thereafter make time 
of the essence, but it was required to give Kelley a reasonable 
time within which to perform. See, e.g., Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 
612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980). What constitutes a reasonable 
time depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. See, 
e.g., Sohavegh v. Oberlander, 155 A.D.2d 436, 438, 547 N.Y.S.2d 
98, 100 (1989) (citations omitted); Cline v. Hullum, 435 P.2d 
152, 156 (Okla. 1967). 
All the evidence in this case showed that September 22, 
1987, was not a reasonable time. 
The only direct evidence on this issue was Mr. Kelley's 
affidavit, in which he stated that, under the circumstances, 
the time that First Security provided him to close allowed him 
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"absolutely no time for review, no time to consult with counsel 
and no time to fully appreciate what had transpired relating to 
the property." R. 278 1 9. Mr, Kelley further testified as 
follows: 
I travelled to Park City, Utah prior to 
September 15, 1987 to review the situation. 
It was my understanding that First Security 
was to make their files available, yet I 
received only the Complaint and Counterclaim, 
and this was at a time significantly after 
it was promised. I did not receive their 
review relating to water rights or any other 
internal documents. . . • I did not receive 
Interrogatories or the rest of their pending 
file. This made it impossible for me to 
make a meaningful review of the case. 
R. 278-79 I 10. Because First Security had repeatedly assured 
Kelley that it would take care of the problem and that he did 
not need an attorney, see R. 289 I 4, Kelley needed a reasonable 
period of time to review First Security's files, obtain engineer-
ing information and assess the situation. R. 280 f 14. He was 
not able to complete his review before September 22, 1987, "in 
large part because First Security . . . failed to make required 
and requested information available to me and because the time 
was simply too short to independently verify and assess the situ-
ation without this information." R. 280 I 14. Finally, Kelley 
testified that, had First Security provided him a reasonable 
period of time, "I would have been able to complete my review 
and close," accepting whatever title First Security had. See 
R. 280 I 14, 279 I 13. 
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None of this evidence was disputed. Moreover, Mr. 
Kelleyfs testimony that September 22, 1987, was not a reasonable 
time for him to close under the circumstances was supported by 
all the evidence in the case. 
Initially, First Security gave Kelley seven days, until 
September 15, 1987, to close.5 At the same time, First Security 
told Kelley that it would sell the property to him without war-
ranty (even though the Agreement called for a special warranty 
deed) and that it would assign to him its rights in the lawsuit 
against the Armstrongs but would not pursue the action because 
it "has never viewed itself as having the obligation to clear 
title, nor does the earnest money agreement provide for that 
obligation." R. 114-15. First Security's offer to close was 
clearly contrary to the parties' Agreement. See infra point 
III. Had Kelley simply accepted that offer, he may have waived 
his rights under the Agreement. See Leche v. Stout, 514 P.2d 
1399, 1403 (Okla. 1972). Thus, First Security correctly advised 
Kelley to obtain legal counsel. First Security also promised to 
cooperate with Kelley's chosen counsel "in order that you can 
make a fully informed judgment." R. 115. 
5
 Although the letter giving Kelley until September 15 
to close was dated September 4, because it was sent over the 
Labor Day weekend, Kelley did not receive it until September 8. 
See R. 288 I 2 & 116. 
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Clearly, seven days was not a reasonable time for Kel-
ley, who lived in Massachusetts, to get an attorney in Utah, 
for his attorney to review the matter, which involved complex 
legal and factual issues regarding the boundary and water prob-
lems, *> and to make a decision as to how to proceed. 
Apparently First Security agreed, because it extended 
the closing date a week, to September 22, 1987. R. 116. How-
ever, even that was not reasonable. As First Security itself 
recognized, before Kelley could make "a fully informed judgment," 
his attorney would have to review the relevant documents, which 
were in First Security's possession. See R. 115. Thus, under 
these circumstances, a reasonable time to perform would have 
been some time after First Security gave Kelley or his attorney 
the relevant documents, and it was undisputed that First Security 
did not give Kelley all the information he needed until October 
15, 1987. R. 283- By that time, Kelley had filed this action 
and paid his down payment into court to preserve his rights under 
the Agreement. 
In short, all of the evidence in the case showed that 
September 22, 1987, did not give Kelley a reasonable time to 
5
 For example, if the Armstrongs could cut off the water 
to Kelley's pond, could they also cut off his culinary water? 
Would he have a $600,000 home with no running water? If he later 
wanted to sell the Property, could he, or would a new buyer be 
unable to get financing or title insurance because of the boundary 
and water problems? 
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close. But even if September 22, 1987, would otherwise have been 
a reasonable date, First Security's failure to cooperate with 
Kelley excused his performance by that date. "One party to a 
contract cannot by willful act or omission make it impossible 
or difficult for the other party to perform and then invoke the 
other[']s nonperformance as a defense." Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 
1374, 1379 n.24 (Utah 1980). Accord Ferris v. Jennings, 595 
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). See also Tanner v. Baadsaaard, 612 
Po2d 345, 347 (Utah 1980) (it is assumed that parties to a real 
estate contract will cooperate with each other in good faith 
for its performance). Yet that is exactly what happened here. 
First Security imposed an unreasonably short deadline on Kelley's 
performance, promised to cooperate with him so that he could meet 
that deadline, and then broke its promise. It was undisputed 
that First Security did not give Kelley the information that 
First Security itself acknowledged he needed to make a "fully 
informed judgment" before its own, unilaterally imposed deadlines. 
It cannot now claim that Kelley was the one who defaulted. 
Nevertheless, Kelley took appropriate action by First 
Security's deadline of September 22, 1987. His counsel wrote 
First Security's counsel, tendering the down payment and offering 
to close in accordance with the Agreement, and he filed this 
action. By filing this action and paying his money into court, 
he elected to proceed with the deal, and he preserved the status 
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quo until the court could declare the parties' respective rights 
and obligations under the Agreement. See, e.g., Reeves v. Hutson, 
144 Cal. App. 2d 445, 301 P.2d 264, 269-70 (1956). 
II. 
KELLEY'S TENDER OF PERFORMANCE WAS NOT DEFECTIVE 
First Security also argued that Kelley's tender of 
performance was defective because it was conditional. That argu-
ment is based on one sentence in a three-page letter from Kelley's 
counsel to First Security's counsel, which was hand-delivered 
the same day that this action was filed. The letter states in 
relevant part: 
My client hereby tenders the down payment owed 
pursuant to the Earnest Money and Receipt to Purchase 
and all amendments thereto. My calculation is that 
the down payment is to be $130,000; $10,000 has earlier 
been placed in escrow which is to be a part of the down 
payment, requiring payment of $120,000. As we have 
seen no closing statments, notes, deeds or mortgages, 
we are uncertain as to the exact amount of cash neces-
sary to close. Therefore, Mr. Kelley has wired $140,000 
to Williamsburg Savings Bank to be held in an account 
and applied to closing. This tender is conditioned 
only upon First Security honoring its obligations pur-
suant to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and deliver-
ing the property free from those defects which it has 
undertaken to cure. Mr. Kelley further requests that 
First Security resolve the issue regarding the water 
rights to the pond immediately in front of the home. 
R. at 120 (emphasis added). 
The only "condition" that this letter imposes is that 
"First Security honor[] its obligations pursuant to the Earnest 
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Money Sales Agreement and deliver [] the property free from those 
defects which it has undertaken to cure." A "condition" that 
one party to a contract comply with its obligations under the 
contract is no condition at all and does not make a tender defec-
tive. See, e.g., Kodiak Island Borough v. Large, 622 P.2d 440, 
448 (Alaska 1981); Burke Aviation Coro. v. Alton Jennings Co. . 
311 P.2d 578, 581 (Okla. 1962); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 637 
P.2d 1020, 1023 (Wyo. 1981). See also Woods v. Dixon, 193 Or. 
681, 240 P.2d 520, 522 (1952) ("a tender may be good if ac-
companied by a condition upon which the buyer has a right to 
insist"). The parties clearly had a difference of opinion as 
to whether First Security had a contractual obligation to clear 
title. That is why Kelley was required to file this action. 
But the September 22, 1987, letter did not impose any new con-
dition on Kelley's tender. It merely set out Kelley's understand-
ing of the parties' rights and obligations under the Agreement 
and insisted that First Security keep its part of the deal. 
If anything, it shows that Kelley was ready, willing and able 
to close the deal. It was only because First Security denied 
its obligations under the Agreement that the deal did not close 
at that time. 
Thus, even if Kelley were required to tender his per-
formance by September 22, 1987, his tender was not defective. 
But, in fact, Kelley's tender of performance was excused. 
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III. 
KELLEY'S TENDER OF PERFORMANCE WAS EXCUSED. 
Where a contract "contemplates simultaneous performance 
by both parties, such as the Earnest Money agreement involved 
in this case, neither party can be said to be in default . . . 
until the other party has tendered his own performance." Century 
21 All Western Real Estate & Investment Inc. v. Webb, 645 P.2d 
52, 56 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted). For a tender to put the 
other party in default, it "must be complete and unconditional." 
Id. 
It was First Security—not Kelley—who made a defective 
tender of performance by offering Kelley less than the Agreement 
called for. Because First Security did not properly tender its 
own performance under the Agreement, Kelley's tender was excused. 
The Agreement required First Security to "furnish good 
and marketable title to the property." R. 16 f 3. It also re-
quired First Security to give Kelley a special warranty deed to 
the Property. R. 16. First Security's letter of September 4, 
1987, however, repudiated both of these obligations. That letter 
stated, in pertinent part: 
First Security is prepared to sell the property 
to you " 'as is' without warranty" in accordance with 
the terms of the earnest money agreement. First Secu-
rity is also prepared to assign you its rights in the 
lawsuit against the Armstrongs. Absent any obligation 
to the contrary or reimbursement from you for its legal 
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costs and fees, First Security is no longer desirous 
of pursuing the lawsuit with the Armstrongs. First 
Security has not pursued the legal action against the 
Armstrongs as a result of any legal obligation, but 
simply because of its interest in closing the deal 
with you. First Security has never viewed itself as 
having the obligation to clear title, nor does the 
earnest money agreement provide for that obligation. 
R. 114-15 (emphasis added). 
First Security's claim that it had no obligation to 
clear title was simply wrong. First Security's express con-
tractual obligation to "furnish good and marketable title" carried 
with it the implied obligation to clear the title if it could 
be done by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Langston v. 
Huff acker, 36 Wash. App. 779, 678 P.2d 1265, 1271 (1984); Ace 
Realty, Inc. v. Loonev, 531 P.2d 1377f 1380 (Okla. 1974). Cf. 
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985) (duty 
of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract).7 
First Security apparently recognized such a duty when it filed 
an action against the Armstrongs, claiming that the action was 
necessary to enable it to fulfill its obligation to give Kelley 
marketable title to the Property. See R. 29-31. 
For title to property to be marketable, "'title must 
be such as to make it reasonably certain that it will not be 
7
 Don Griffin, the seller's agent, also suggested that 
an obligation to clear up the boundary and water problems was 
implied in the contract. See Deposition of Don Griffin at 96-
97 (exhibit A to Kelley's Petition for Rehearing before the Court 
of Appeals). 
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called into question in the future so as to subject the purchaser 
to the hazard of litigation with reference thereto.'" Hedaecock 
v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 676 P.2d 1208f 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1983) (quoting Morlev v. Gieseker, 142 Colo. 490, 351 P.2d 392 
(1960)) . By First Security's own admission in the Armstrong com-
plaint, title to the Property was unmarketable. See R. 29-30 I 
17. Obviously, if First Security felt that title was marketable 
irrespective of the boundary and water problems or that it had 
no obligation to furnish marketable title, it would not have 
filed the Armstrong action. Moreover, the very fact that the Arm-
strong suit existed is clear evidence that the hazard of litiga-
tion was not merely a possibility but a reality. 
By the time First Security sent its demand letter on 
September 4, 1987, First Security had apparently changed its 
mind. It did not claim that title to the property was marketable 
or that it could not be made marketable. It simply claimed that 
it had no obligation to clear title. This assertion was clearly 
wrong. Kelley did not have to accept First Security's interpre-
tation of its own oligations under the Agreement, nor did he 
have to waive his contractual right to receive good and marketable 
title based solely on First Security's assertion that it had no 
obligation to clear title. See, e.g.. Ace Realty, Inc. v. Looney, 
531 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974); Yost Farm Co. v. Cremer, 152 Mont, 
200, 447 P.2d 688, 692 (1968). 
- 25 -
In denying its obligation to clear title, First Security 
relied on a handwritten provision of the Agreement, which read 
in pertinent part: "Property sold 'as is' without warranty. 
Title conveyed by Special Warranty Deed corp. form. Other terms 
to remain the same." R. 16. This provision did not relieve 
First Security of its obligation "to furnish good and marketable 
title." 
Obviously, the handwritten phrase "property sold 'as 
is' without warranty" referred to the physical condition or habit-
ability of the property and not to any implied warranties of 
title. From the time that a contract for the sale of real 
property is executed until the deed is delivered and accepted, 
there are no implied warranties of title that can be disclaimed. 
Indeed, the seller need not even have title to the property during 
the executory period of the contract. Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 
30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (1973); Callister v. Millstream 
Associates. Inc.. 738 P.2d 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Because 
there are no implied warranties of title associated with the 
contract of sale, the only warranties that can be disclaimed by 
a seller at the time the contract of sale is executed are the 
warranties of habitability, good and workmanlike construction 
and compliance with building codes. All of these warranties con-
cern the physical condition of the property, not the status of 
its title. See Scheops v. Howe. 665 P.2d 504 (Wyo. 1983); 
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Schoeneweis v. Herrin, 110 111. App. 3d 800, 443 N.E.2d 36 (1982); 
Tibbitts v. Ooenshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967); Mulkev 
v. Waaooner, 177 Ga. App. 165, 338 S.E.2d 755 (1985). Thus, 
the phrase "Property sold 'as is' without warranty" did not re-
lieve First Security of its obligation to furnish Kelley market-
able title by special warranty deed. 
Similarly, the provision that the conveyance was to be 
by "special warranty deed" did not alter First Security's ob-
ligation to furnish marketable title. In the context of agree-
ments for the purchase of real property, a promise to furnish 
marketable title is entirely compatible with conveyance by war-
ranty deed, special warranty deed or quitclaim deed. Depart-
ment of Public Works and Buildings v. Halls, 35 111. 2d 283, 
220 N.E.2d 167 (1966); Linincrer v. Blackhills Greyhound Racing 
Association. 82 S.D. 507, 149 N.W.2d 413 (1967); Wallach v. River-
side Bank, 206 N.Y. 434, 100 N.E. 50 (1912). 
Because First Security was not prepared to convey mar-
ketable title as required by the Agreement when it made its offer 
of September 4, 1987, its own tender was defective and therefore 
could not put Kelley in default or force him to choose between 
his alleged contractual remedies of waiving the defect and walking 
away from the deal. 
First Security's tender was also defective for another 
reason. First Security's offer to sell the Property to Kelley 
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"'as is' without warranty," was contrary to the next sentence 
of the Agreement, which required First Security to convey title 
by Special Warranty Deed. First Security's interpretation of 
the "as is" provision read the next sentence out of the Agreement. 
All provisions of an agreement must be given meaning if possible. 
See, e.g., Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). The 
obvious way to reconcile the two provisions is to realize that 
the "as is" provision relates to the physicial condition of the 
Property and has nothing to do with the warranties of title in-
cluded in a special warranty deed. £f. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. 
v. Combe, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Even if First Security's interpretation of the "as 
is" provision were correct, the undisputed evidence shows that 
First Security in fact was not prepared to sell Kelley the 
Property in the condition it was when the Agreement was made. 
The property was marketed as including three ponds and a year-
round running stream. R. 259. When the Agreement was made, 
the ponds were full, and the stream was running. Sometime there-
after, the Armstrongs cut off the water to the property, causing 
the trout pond to dry up. The Agreement stated, "All risk of 
loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until 
closing." R. 17 3 P. Yet First Security refused to do anything 
about the admitted vandalism to the property, which First Security 
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itself acknowledged had damaged the property and "reduced its 
value substantially," R. 50 I 74. See R. 120. 
In short, if anyone put conditions on his tender of 
performance, it was First Security, not Kelley. First Security's 
offer to close required Kelley to accept First Security's own 
interpretation of its contractual duties, which was contrary to 
the terms of the Agreement and to the applicable law. Had Kelley 
accepted First Security's offer on its terms, he would have had 
to waive his rights under the Agreement. Thus, First Security's 
offer was improperly conditioned on Kelley's acceptance of less 
than he was entitled to under the Agreement. 
Not only did First Security's letter of September 4, 
1987, constitute a defective tender of performance, but, by that 
letter, First Security repudiated its obligations under the Agree-
ment to give Kelley good and marketable title by special warranty 
deed. When a party to an executory contract manifests a positive 
and unequivocal intent to not render its promised performance 
at the required time, an anticipatory breach of the contract 
occurs. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 
30 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Hurwitz v. David K. Richards 
Co. , 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P*2d 794, 796 (1968)). First Security's 
repudiation of any obligation on its part to try to clear title 
constituted an anticipatory breach of the Agreement. Q£. id. 
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Whether First Security's refusal is considered an an-
ticipatory breach of the contract or a defective tender of First 
Security's own performance, the effect was to relieve Kelley of 
his obligation to tender. See, e.g., Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 
1374, 1379 (Utah 1980); Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977); 
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); King 
v. Allen, 9 Mass. App. 821, 398 N.E.2d 510 (1980); Leche v. Stout, 
514 P.2d 1399, 1403 (Okla. 1972). 
The law does not require a contracting party to do a 
"useless act and tender performance where the other contracting 
party cannot or will not perform his part of the agreement." 
Barker, 741 P.2d at 553 (quoting Jenson v. Richens, 74 Wash. 2d 
41, 442 P.2d 636, 639 (1968), which held that, where vendors 
had undertaken to deliver an encumbrance-free title, the promise 
to furnish good title was a condition precedent to the promise 
to purchase). See also McFadden v. Wilder, 6 Ariz. App. 60, 
429 P.2d 694 (1967) (where the seller does not tender marketable 
title, the duty of the purchaser to tender performance does not 
arise, and the seller is therefore not excused from performance). 
In Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977), the pur-
chaser sued to compel specific performance of an agreement to 
purchase residential property. The agreement provided that the 
defendant would furnish marketable title with a title insurance 
policy in the purchaser's name. Upon receipt of the title in-
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surance policy, however, the real estate broker realized that 
the property was burdened by a federal tax lien and several other 
exceptions to title. The broker contacted each party regarding 
these title problems and he was instructed to resolve them as 
soon as possible. On the original closing date, the purchaser 
had sufficient funds to make the payment required by the agreement 
but did not tender payment. After several meetings and a delay 
of six weeks, the real estate broker informed the vendor that 
all of the problems had been resolved and that closing could be 
accomplished at any time. It was at that time that the vendor 
first indicated that he was no longer interested in closing the 
transaction. About a month later, the real estate broker again 
contacted the vendor to secure the closing. The vendor then 
stated that since the purchaser had failed to make the payment 
required by the contract on the first closing date, he recognized 
no further obligations under the contract. Upon the vendor's 
continued refusal to cooperate, the purchaser sued for specific 
performance. 
This court upheld the trial court's judgment of specific 
performance and rejected the defendant's contention that it was 
released from any obligation under the contract because the plain-
tiff had failed to perform: 
Inasmuch as under the contract it was the defendant's 
responsibility to furnish good title and a title in-
surance policy, the furnishing thereof was a condition 
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precedent to his right to demand payment from the pur-
chaser (plaintiff). 
It is fundamental that a party to a contract should 
obtain no advantage from the fact that he is himself 
unable to perform. Since the defendant had not come 
forth with the agreed title insurance policy demon-
strating that he could convey a clear and marketable 
title as of the proposed closing date, • • . he could 
neither demand payment by the plaintiff on that date, 
nor claim that the latter was in default for failing 
to make the payment. 
560 P.2d at 1126 (footnotes omitted). See also Fischer v. 
Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974); Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 
157, 129 P. 619 (1912). 
In this case, as in Huck v. Hayes, First Security, as 
seller, was required to furnish marketable title as a condition 
precedent to its right to demand that Kelley tender his perfor-
mance. Its unjustified refusal to do so excused Kelley's tender. 
Thus, Kelley's tender, rather than being imperfect, as First 
Security asserted, was not even required, and Kelley was entitled 
to ask the court to specifically enforce the Agreement. 
IV. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION WAS BASED ON 
FINDINGS OF FACT THAT WERE NOT MADE BELOW AND NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that 
Kelley's only remedy was a refund of his earnest money deposit, 
not specific performance. The court based its decision on the 
following syllogism: 
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a. Under paragraph H of the Agreement, if title to 
the property could not be made insurable without exceptions 
for defects, Kelley had two options: (1) to waive the defects 
and proceed with the sale, or (2) terminate the Agreement 
and have his earnest money refunded. 
b. Title could not be made so insurable. 
c. Kelley refused to waive the defects. 
d. Therefore, Kelley's only remedy was a return of 
his earnest money. 
The Court of Appeals' decision cannot stand if either 
of the two minor premises of the syllogism (b or c) fails. The 
Court of Appeals erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that 
title could not be made insurable and that Kelley refused to 
waive any defect. 
Both minor premises of the Court of Appeals' syllogism 
are statements of fact. The trial court did not expressly make 
factual findings with respect to either premise, because First 
Security did not raise any issue with respect to either premise. 
Thus, for the Court of Appeals to rule as it did, it first had 
to find its own facts. 
It is axiomatic that trial courts find facts and ap-
pellate courts review their findings. An appellate court cannot 
substitute itself as a finder of fact. E.g., Board of County 
Commissioners v. Auslaender. 745 P.2d 999, 1002 (Colo. 1987). 
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Yet that is what the Court of Appeals did in this case. For 
that reason alone, this Court should reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeals. The Court should also reverse, however, 
because the Court of Appeals' factual findings were not supported 
by the evidence. 
A. Insurability of Title. 
As Leucadia recognizes, the facts relevant to the 
Court's determination that title could not be made insurable 
without exceptions for defects were not before the Court of Ap-
peals. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 14 n.7 & 16 n.10. The mere fact that there 
was a title problem does not trigger the remedy provisions of 
paragraph H. That paragraph states: 
If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes 
the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment 
for a standard form ALTA policy of title insurance to 
be issued by such title insurance company as Seller 
shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall con-
tain no exceptions other than those provided for in said 
standard form, and the encumbrances or defects excepted 
under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be 
made so insurable through an escrow agreement at 
closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects 
to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to 
Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. 
R. 15. Thus, before the Court of Appeals could even determine 
whether paragraph H applied, it had to determine that the title 
policy to be issued did not contain certain exceptions. To make 
that determination, the court had to compare the title policy 
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to be issued with the preliminary commitment for title insurance 
or a standard form ALTA policy, none of which were in the record 
on appeal. 
Before relying on paragraph H, the court also had to 
determine whether title could be made "insurable through an escrow 
agreement at closing." Again, there was no evidence on this 
issue on which the Court of Appeals could base its decision.^ 
There was no evidence that the alleged title defect in this case 
was in fact not curable, let alone not curable through an escrow 
agreement at closing. 
B. Refusal to Waive Title Defects. 
The Court of Appeals' finding that "Kelley refused to 
waive" any defects was also contrary to the undisputed evidence.9 
A waiver is an unequivocal relinquishment of a known 
right. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 
y
 What evidence there was in the case, all of which was 
developed through discovery after the trial court's ruling, sug-
gests that the property was insurable. For example, Don Griffin, 
the real estate agent involved in the transaction, testified 
that there was a title insurance company that would insure the 
property. See Deposition of Don Griffin at 101-03, a copy of 
which was included as exhibit A to Kelley's Petition for Rehearing. 
9 It was also inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' con-
clusion that Kelley refused tc accept the option of terminating 
the Agreement under paragraph 6. See slip op. at 3. If Kelley 
had the option under either paragraph G or H to enforce the Agree-
ment or to terminate it and he refused to terminate it, then he 
must have chosen to enforce the Agreement, which necessarily meant 
waiving any title defects if he was in fact required to waive them 
under paragraph H. 
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445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968). Intention to waive a right is ordinarily 
a question of fact. See, e.g.. Yates v. American Republic Corp., 
163 F.2d 178, 180 (10th Cir. 1947); Chavez v. Gomez, 77 N.M. 341, 
423 P.2d 31, 33 (1967). The only evidence of Kelley's intent 
was Kelley's affidavits, which unequivocally showed that Kelley 
intended to enforce the Agreement. R. 279 M 12-13 & 289 If 2-
3.10 
The closing date had been extended three times by agree-
ment, for a minimum of thirty days each time, to allow First 
Security to clear up the boundary and water problems, which First 
Security had undertaken to do on its own, without any request 
from Kelley. During this time Kelley was repeatedly told that 
First Security was working out the problems and would correct them 
before closing. See R. 289 5 3. He was looking for another ex-
tension agreement when he received the letter from First Secur-
ity's counsel giving him seven days to close, with the title 
issues still unresolved, or to "walk away from the deal." R. 
114-15, 292-93. In response to this letter Kelley sent First 
Security's attorney a mailgram stating, "Will not walk away. 
10 Kelley's deposition testimony, which admittedly was 
not part of the record in the Court of Appeals, is consistent 
with his affidavit. Kelley repeatedly testified that he was 
willing to close at any time, even with the boundary problems, 
and that he communicated that willingness to Don Griffin and 
Vivian Cropper, the seller's agents. See Deposition of William 
R. Kelley, Jr. at 71-86, 125-28, 134-36 (exhibit A to Kelley's 
Petition for Rehearing before the Court of Appeals). 
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Based on history, need normal 30-day extension." Id. at 294. 
Kelley's response does not indicate any refusal to waive title 
defects. Rather, it shows a refusal to walk away from the deal. 
If Kelley was in fact required to choose between waiving defects 
or walking away from the deal, one must conclude from this evi-
dence that Kelley elected to waive any defects. 
The only possible bases for the Court of Appeals' con-
clusion that Kelley refused to waive any defect are his counsel's 
letter of September 22, 1987, and his filing of this action. 
Neither action, however, proves that Kelley refused to waive 
any defect. They merely show that Kelley refused to waive any 
rights he might have under the Agreement. They show that Kelley 
elected to enforce the Agreement according to its terms and that 
he wanted a court—not First Security—to construe those terms. 
If to enforce the Agreement according to its terms meant that 
Kelley had to waive any title defect, the evidence shows that 
he was prepared to do so, and he must be deemed to have done 
so. But it was for the court—not First Security—to say whether 
he was required to do so. By not raising the issue as a defense 
and then settling Kelley's damage claim, it was First Security 
—not Kelley—who lost its right to enforce the Agreement (as 
it understood the Agreement). 
In short, the only evidence was that Kelley insisted 
that First Security comply with the Agreement, that he brought 
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an action to enforce compliance and that he accepted a special 
warranty deed from First Security that did not include the dis-
puted portion of the property. These actions show that Kelley 
in fact did not refuse to waive any defect. The Court of Appeals' 
contrary finding was not supported by the record. 
Regardless of whether the Court of Appeals' conclusions 
on these fact issues were correct, however, it was for the trial 
court—not the Court of Appeals—to find the facts. The trial 
court made no findings of fact on these issues because they were 
never raised by First Security. This Court has reversed decisions 
of the Court of Appeals where that court has failed to properly 
apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to a trial court's 
finding of facts. See, e.g., Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 
P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990). This Court should also reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals where, as here, that court makes 
its own findings of fact that are not supported by the record. 
V. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION WAS WRONG 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Not only was the Court of Appeals' decision based on 
improper findings of fact, but it was also based on errors of law. 
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A. Kellev Was Not Required to Waive Any Defect, 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that Kelley "refused 
to waive" title defects could only limit Kelley's remedies if 
he was required to waive defects. Under the facts of this case, 
he was not. 
First, as shown in point IV.A, supra, First Security 
never met its burden of showing that the conditions precedent 
had been met for the remedy provisions of paragraph H to even 
apply. 
Moreover, Kelley was not required to waive any title 
defect if it could be corrected. First Security had an obligation 
to clear title if it could do so by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. See supra point III. Paragraph H could only come 
into play after First Security fulfilled that obligation. Whether 
or not First Security could have cleared title by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence and whether or not it had in fact exer-
cised reasonable diligence were fact questions that were never 
raised or decided in the trial court and therefore did not pre-
clude the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in 
favor of Kelley. The only evidence before the trial court was 
that First Security undertook to correct the boundary and water 
problems and then changed its mind. First Security did not base 
its September 4, 1987, demand on any inability to clear title• 
Rather, it claimed it had no obligation to clear title and simply 
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was "no longer desirous of pursuing the lawsuit" it had started 
to clear title. Neither claim excused First Security's contrac-
tual obligation to convey clear title, see Ace Realty, Inc. v. 
Loonev, 531 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Okla. 1974); Carcione v. Clark, 96 
Nev. 808, 618 P.2d 346, 348 (1980), and thus Kelley's obligation 
to elect his remedy under paragraph H never arose. 
B. Kelley's Election of Remedy Constituted a Waiver of Any Title 
Defect. 
Similarly,- the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Kelley 
refused to waive any defect is contrary to the controlling law. 
Assuming that the remedy provision of paragraph H applied, Kelley 
had the option to waive any title defects and enforce the Agree-
ment or to declare the Agreement null and void and receive a 
return of his earnest money. "The former remedy counts upon 
the affirmance or validity of the transaction, the latter repu-
diates the transaction and counts upon its invalidity. The two 
remedies are inconsistent, and the choice of one rejects the 
other, because the sale cannot be valid and void at the [same] 
time." Cook v. Covev-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 169, 253 
P. 196 (1927). 
Where, as here, a party has a choice between two or 
more inconsistent remedies, he has a duty to choose between them. 
And, "where the duty to elect applies, then the bringing of an 
action based upon one of the remedies or rights constitutes an 
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election which is irrevocable except in case of mistake of fact 
or some other good and sufficient legal excuse." Howard v. J.P. 
Paulson Co., 41 Utah 490, 495, 127 P. 284 (1912). 
By filing this action for specific performance, Kelley 
elected his remedy. He chose to treat the Agreement as valid 
and paid his down payment into court. He could not thereafter 
terminate the contract. Cook, 69 Utah at 168; Salt Lake Citv 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Utah 213, 220-21, 17 P.2d 239, 242-43 
(1932) (an election of remedy is made when an action is commenced 
on one of two inconsistent remedies). If the consequence of 
Kelley's election was that he thereby waived any title defects, 
then the court could tailor its order of specific performance 
accordingly. But First Security never raised that defense, and 
its settlement of the issue that the trial court reserved for 
decision, namely, whether or not Kelley was entitled to damages 
for First Security's failure to convey clear title to the entire 
property, moots any defense First Security may have had based 
on paragraph H. 
VI. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE RELIEF IT GRANTED. 
Leucadia's appeal followed the trial court's grant of 
partial summary judgment to Kelley. If the trial court erred in 
granting Kelley partial summary judgment, the proper remedy would 
have been to reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for 
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a trial on the merits. Instead, the Court of Appeals remanded 
the case for entry of judgment, presumably in favor of Leucadia. 
If the Court of Appeals was correct that paragraph H of the Agree-
ment was dispositive of this case, at a minimum there existed 
disputed factual questions concerning the insurability of the 
title and Kelley's intention in waiving or refusing to waive 
any defect, precluding summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Equity allows contracts for the sale of real property 
to be specifically enforced because each piece of real property 
is unique. One of the features of the Property in this case 
that made it unique—indeed, that made it the Kelleys' dream 
home—was the stream and trout pond. But there were problems 
with the Property. Because of a boundary survey error, the 
Armstrongs thought they were entitled to cut off the water to 
the Property. They did, and the pond dried up. 
First Security undertook to correct the problems and 
told Kelley not to worry about them. For over four months, First 
Security gave Kelley the impression that it was First Security's 
problem, not Kelley's, and that First Security would take care 
of it. Then, when a better deal came along offering First 
Security a way out of the lawsuit it had started to resolve the 
problems, First Security changed its tune. It wrote Kelley, 
repudiating its obligations under the Agreement to convey clear 
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title and to give Kelley any title warranties. It offered Kelley 
two choices—to close the deal on First Security's terms, which 
Kelley thought were contrary to the terms of the parties' Agree-
ment, or to walk away from the deal. 
Even First Security recognized that Kelley needed time 
to review the situation and to make "a fully informed judgment.M 
He did not want to be in the position of the ambassador to Kuwait, 
living in a house without any water. Yet, after First Security 
had had over four months to review the problems, it gave Kelley 
less than three weeks to evaluate the situation and then withheld 
from him documents he needed to make his decision. 
Nevertheless, all of the evidence in the case shows 
that Kelley refused to walk away from the deal. But he also 
did not want to waive any rights he had under the Agreement based 
solely on First Security's own interpretation of its obligations 
under the Agreement. 
Kelley thought he had a third option—to take the 
Property and ask a court to sort out the parties' respective 
rights and obligations. After all, courts are in the business 
of interpreting contracts and resolving disputes * So he brought 
this action, asking the court to interpret and enforce the par-
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ties' Agreement according to its terms.11 In effect, Kelley 
said, "Give me the Property, and we'll see what rights I have." 
The trial court agreed that Kelley was entitled to 
the Property. At that point, First Security could have asked 
the court to rule that, because Kelley chose to take the Property, 
he waived any right to claim damages for any title defects or an 
abatement in the purchase price. But it did not. Instead, it 
settled Kelley's damage claim. 
That should have ended the matter. But the Court of 
Appeals took a provision of the Agreement that was never an issue 
in the trial court and was clearly meant for the buyer's benefit 
and construed it to give the seller the option of terminating 
the Agreement by simply refusing to do anything about any title 
defect. 
The Court of Appeals' decision that Kelley refused to 
waive defects was simply wrong. Kelley never said he would not 
take the Property with title defects. He simply asked First 
Security to do what the Agreement said it would do and what it 
had undertaken to do but later denied having any obligation to 
do. He simply asked the court to enforce the Agreement according 
to its terms. If that meant that he had no remedy for title 
1 1
 By bringing this action, Kelley also sought to prevent 
First Security from selling the Property out from under him. 
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defects, that would have been the proper decision—not that he 
lost his right to enforce the Agreement. 
Because the Court of Appeals' decision was contrary 
to the undisputed evidence, this Court should reverse that deci-
sion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of December, 1990. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
(Original signature) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Brief of Petitioner were mailed, pos-
tage prepaid thereon, this ^** day of December, 1990, to: 
John A. Snow, Esq. 
Kathryn H. Snedaker, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
D. FRANK WILKINS, ESQ. 
DAVID W. JOHNSON, ESQ. 
175 South Main Street #1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Utah Association of Realtors 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, ESQ. 
Attorney General 
DAVID W. LUND, ESQ. 
Assistant Attorney General 
130 Utah State Capitol; 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
Division of Real Estate 
{Wl. flA. AwwfiAMQ. 
(Original signature) 
PS13.3 
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A D D E N D U M 
NO 
DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. #2458 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ. #4658 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., | 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE | 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation ] 
and JOHN DOES I-X, ; 
Defendants. ] 
1 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
> Civil No. 9532 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came on 
regularly before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson presiding, for hearing on Monday, December 7, 1987 at 
the hour of 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented by David R. Olsen, 
Esq. and Charles P. Sampson, Esq. and defendant First Security 
Mortgage Company was represented by Craig L. Taylor, Esq. The 
Court, having entered its Order granting plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of specific per-
formance and defendant First Security Mortgage Company is, 
Clef* z\ bummit County 
Oeouty Cls4 
U -J O *~ 
therefore, to convey by Special Warranty Deed that property which 
is the subject of that Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
dated February 20, 1987, between William R. Kelley, Jr. as "Buyer" 
and First Security Mortgage as "Seller" (hereinafter "Agreement"), 
specifically described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, together 
with any and all water rights incident thereto or appurtenant there-
with. The conveyance is to take place at the time final judgment 
is entered in this action. 
2. The Court will retain jurisdiction over this matter 
to determine: 
(a) whether plaintiff is entitled to an abatement 
of the purchase price and, if so, in what amount; and/or 
(b) whether First Security Mortgage Company intended 
to convey and/or is obligated to convey the additional 
approximate 15.22 feet on the border of the property as 
more particularly referenced in the Amended Complaint 
filed in First Security Mortgage Company vs. Armstrong, 
et al., Civil No. 9447, In the Third Judicial District 
Court of Summit county, State of Utah. 
(c) whether plaintiff is entitled to actual and 
punitive damages as a result of any breaches of the Agree-
ment and/or First Security Mortgage Company7s conduct; 
L* *.- /-* j O b o 
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BOOK, i l l PAGE ' : J I 
(d) The other relief prayed for in plaintiff's 
Complaint together with the defenses raised by defendant 
First Security Mortgage Company. 
DATED this / day of -January, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
V-— fo>^c*C 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Partial Summary Judgment was hand delivered 
this day of January, 1988, to: 
Craig L. Taylor, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebelcer 
79 South Main #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D&UhJL, A A J ^ K -
CS15.38 
"
 3
 " OJIW 
DAVID R. OLSEN, Esq. #2458 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, #4658 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
NO. 
F I L E D 
Clark u. i.i.'.iin,; i_ou/.;y 
CY. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation,, and JOHN 
DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE OF SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE 
Civil No. 9532 
Trial in this action was scheduled for May 5 and 6, 1988, 
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge. On February 
3, 1988, this Court entered its Order of Partial Summary Judgment 
requiring defendant to convey the property to plaintiff. On May 
6 # 1988, this Court entered its Order which, among other parti<= 
culars, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant relatinc 
to plaintiff's claims for punitive damages. The only issue re-
maining for trial was the amount of damages to be awarded to plain-
tiff. The parties have settled all claims relating to the amount 
of damages to be awarded to plaintiff and the Court, being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby 
rt 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of specific per-
formance and defendant First Security Mortgage is ordered to convey 
by Special Warranty Deed that property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, more particularly described as follows: 
Tract A: Beginning at a point South 2630.74 
feet and West 2776.80 feet from the Northeast 
corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 4° 03' East 421.40 feet; thence 
South 56*22' West 261.80 feet; thence South 
50*52' West 278.0 feet; thence South 47*34' 
West 500.0 feet; thence North 28*34' West 538.0 
feet to the center line of ditch; thence North 
53*10' East 36.0 feet along said ditch to an 
old spring; thence North 40° East 181..0 feet; 
thence North 71• East 87.0 feet; thence North 
66*38' East 147,61 feet; thence North 30*35' 
East 43.50 feet; thence East 111.0 feet; thence 
North 45* East 86.0 feet; thence North 37*38' 
East 125.0 feet; thence North 59*50' East 207.0 
feet; thence South 67*05' East 23.0 feet; thence 
North 37*55' East 55.0 feet; thence North 34*15' 
East 75.0 feet; thence East 43.82 feet; thence 
South'37.0 feet; thence South 88°25' East 77.0 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Tract B: Beginning at a point South 2630.74 
feet and West 2776.80 feet from the Northeast 
corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 4*03' East 421.40 feet; thence 
North 53*40' East 112.67, thence North 0*53' 
East 354.74 feet; thence South 89°30' West 
126.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with a right-of-way for ingress to and egress from 
Tract A and Tract B over a roadway which is approximately 
three rods wide, the centerline of which is more particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at a point South 2607.61 feet and 
West 2853.77 feet from the Northeast corner 
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of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake. Base and Meridian, and running thence 
South 89°36' East, 2597.86 feet, more or less, 
to the center of the state highway. 
Less and excepting from Tract A and Tract B, the following: 
Beginning at a point South 2615.05 feet and 
West 2724.10 feet from the Northeast corner 
of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point also 
being on a fence line and running thence South 
lc24'14" West along said fence line 151.84 
feet; thence North 88#25' West 132.89 feet; 
thence North 0°16' West 150.00 feet; thence 
South 88°25' East 84.595 feet; thence North 
89°30' East 52.69 feet to the point of begin-
ning. 
The form of the conveyance shall be by Special Warranty Deed in 
that form attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
2. Defendant First Security Mortgage Company shall exe-
cute and deliver to plaintiff a Quit Claim Deed in the form attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B". 
3. The Clerk shall deliver to counsel for plaintiff 
all sums held by the Court, 
4. Gump & Ayers Real Estate, Inc. shall deliver to plain-
tiff the Earnest Money deposit held by it. 
DATED this & day of May, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT B. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
llGJZ* "TASTjbR, Esq. 
R A Y ^ U I N N E Y & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Esq. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Judgment Decree of Specific Performance to be 
mailed this day of May, 1988, postage prepaid, to: 
Craig L. Taylor, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
Attorney for Defendants 
79 S. Main #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
rJud^jL^ k&deA' 
DR04.24 
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Space Above for Recorder's Use 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal 
office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
grantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against all claiming by, 
through or under it to WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., grantee, of 
P. 0. Box 257, Hull, Massachusetts 02045, for the sum of TEN AND 
NO/100 DOLLARS the following described tracts of land in Summmit 
County, State of Utah: 
See Exhibit HAM attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein and made a part 
hereof. 
With exception to the following: 
An action pending in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for the County of Summit, 
State of Utah, entitled First Security Mortgage 
Company, a Utah corporation (successor in interest 
to R E H, Incorporated), Plaintiff, vs. Hebert S. 
Armstrong, William Melbourne Armstrong, Jr., 
Joseph F. Ringholz and Raye C. Ringholz, Defendants, 
and filed as Civil No. 9447, records of Summit 
County, Utah. 
Lis Pendens in said action was recorded on July 10, 
1987, as Entry No. 273994, in Book 438, at Page 20, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
An action pending in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for the County of Summit, 
State of Utah, entitled William R. Kelley, Jr., 
Plaintiff, vs. First Security Mortgage Company, a 
Utah corporation, et al., Defendant, filed as Civil 
No. 9532, records of Summit .County, Utah. (See copy 
of complaint for purpose of action.) 
Lis Pendens in said action was recorded 
September 22, 1987, as Entry No. 277037, in Book 
445, at page 193, records of Summit County, Utah. 
3. A Special Warranty Deed executed in favor of 
Leucadia Financial Corporation, dated November 25, 
1987, recorded November 30, 1987, as Entry No. 
280465, in Book 454, at Page 217, records of Summit 
County, Utah. 
4. A Quit-Claim Deed executed in favor of Leucadia 
Financial Corporation, dated November 25, 1987, 
recorded November 30, 1987, as Entry No. 280466, in 
Book 454, at Page 220, records of Summit County, 
Utah. 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this 
deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized by 
the grantor. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has executed this deed as 
of this duly authorized officers this 6"th day of May, 1988. 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
By: . 
Its: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
On the 6th day of May, 1988, personally appeared before 
me , , who being by me duly sworn, did say, 
that he is the of First Security Mortgage Company, and 
that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of its bylaws or a resolution of its board of directors, 
and said acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at _ 
3340g 
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EXHIBIT "A" TO SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
The real property subject to said Special Warranty Deed is 
located in Summit County, State of Utah and is more particulary 
described as follows: 
Said real property is also described as follows: 
Parcel No. 1: Beginning at a point South 2630.74 feet and West 
2776.80 feet from the northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 4 degrees 03* East 421.40 feet; thence South 56 
degrees 22* West 261.80 feet; thence South 50 degrees 52' West 
278.0 feet; thence South 47 degrees 34' West 500.0 feet; thence 
North 28 degrees 34' West 538\0 feet to the center line of a 
ditch; thence North 53 degrees 10' East 36.0 feet along said 
ditch to an old spring; thence North 40 degrees East 181.0 
feet; thence North 71 degrees East 87.0 feet; thence North 66 
degrees 38* East 147.61 feet; thence North 30 degrees 35' East 
43.50 feet; thence East 111.0 feet; thence North 45 degrees 
East 86.0 feet; thence North 37 degrees 38' East 125.0 feet; 
thence North 59 degrees 50' East 207.0 feet; thence South 67 
degrees 05' East 23.0 feet; thence North 37 degrees 55* East 
55.0 feet; thence North 34 degrees 15x East 75.0 feet; thence 
East 43.82 feet; thence South 37.0 feet; thence South 88 
degrees 25' East 77.0 feet to the point of beginning. 
PARCEL NO. 2: Beginning at a point South 2630.74 feet and West 
2776.80 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence South 4 degrees 03' East 421.40 feet; thence North 53 
degrees 40' East 112.67 feet; thence North 0 degrees 53' East 
354.74 feet; thence South 89 degrees 30' West 126.00 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way for ingress to and egress from 
Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2 over a roadway which is 
approximately three rods wide, .the centerline of which is more 
particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING AT a point South 2607.61 feet and West 2853.77 feet 
from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence South 
89 degrees 36' East, 2597.86 feet, more or less, to the center 
of the state highway. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING from Parcel No. 1 and Parcel No. 2, the 
following: 
BEGINNING AT a point South 2615.05 feet and West 2724.10 feet 
from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point also being on a 
fence line and running thence South 1 degree 24*14" West along 
said fence line 151.84 feet; thence North 88 degrees 25' West 
132-89 feet; thence North 0 degrees 16' West 150.00 feet; 
thence South 88 degrees 25' East 84.595 feet; thence North 89 
degrees 30* East 52.69 feet to the point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO easements, restrictions, and rights of way appearing 
of record. 
ALSO SUBJECT TO the lien of general property taxes after 
January 1, 1987. 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Space Above for Recorder's Use 
Quit-Claim Deed 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its 
principal office at Salt Lake City, of County of Salt Lake, State 
of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to WILLIAM R. KELLEY, JR., an 
individual, grantee, of P. O. Box 257, Hull, Massachusetts 02045, 
for the sum of TEN AND NO/100 DOLLARS, the following described 
tracts of land in Summit County, State of Utah: 
See Exhibit MAM attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated herein and made a part 
hereof. 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this 
deed and the transfer represented thereby was duly authorized by 
the grantor. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has executed this deed as 
of this 6th day of May, 1988. 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE COMPANY 
By 
Its 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
On the 6th day of May, 1988, personally appeared before 
me , who being by me duly sworn, did 
say, that he is the of First Security Mortgage 
Company, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said 
corporation by authority of its bylaws or a resolution of its 
board of directors, and said acknowledged to 
me that said corporation executed the same. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at _ 
'5'3*3Q« 
EXHIBIT "A" TO QUITCLAIM DEEP 
The real property subject to said Quitclaim Deed is located in 
Summit Comity, State of Utah and is \nore particulary described 
as follows: 
Said real property is also described as follows: 
Beginning at a point South 2615.05 feet and West 2724.10 feet 
from the Northeast corner of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 
4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
89°30'00M East 73.31 feet; thence South 00°53'00" West 369.97 
feet; thence South 53°40*00" West 112.67 feet; thence South 
56°22'00" West 261.80 feet; thence South 50°52'00" West 278.0 
feet; thence South ^^A'OO*' West 500.00 feet; thence North 
28°34,00" West 550.31 feet to the center line of a ditch; 
thence North 53°10'00" East 43.37 feet along said ditch to an 
old spring; thence along said centerline of ditch the following 
twelve courses: thence 1) North 40°00'00" East 181.00 feet; 
thence 2) North 71o00'00" East 87.00 feet; thence 3) North 
66°38,00** East 147.61 feet; thence 4) North 30°35,00" East 
43.50 feet; thence 5) East 111.00 feet; thence 6) North 
45°00,00" East 86.00 feet; thence 7) North 37°38'00" East 
125.00 feet; thence 8) North 59°50'00" East 207.00 feet; thence 
9) South 67°05,00" East 23.00 feet; thence 10) North 37°55'00" 
East 55.00 feet; thence 11) North 34°15'00" East 75.00 feet; 
thence 12) East 43.82 feet; thence South 37.00 feet; thence 
North 88°25'00M West 7.60 feet; thence South 00°16'00'* East 
150.00 feet; thence South 88°25,00" East 132.89 feet; thence 
North 01°24'14" East 151.84 feet to the point of beginning. 
late of Utah ) 
ounty of Summit > ** 
I, Douglas R Geary, Clerk of the District Court In and for 
ummit County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
jregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the 
\ the matterof the entitled ' • j f f t ^ a . ' '' 
s the same appears of record and upon file in my office. 
V WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and 
rffix the seal of .said Ca ' •*• -^^day of 77h« \oW 
"nt.^JL ,. XMJLZZZ Clerk 
iy \j?jy A?i (Yt^t* Deputy Clerk 
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OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880534-CA 
Third District Court, Summit County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: John A. Snow and Kathryn H. Snedaker, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
David R. Olsen, Charles P. Sampson, and Claudia F, 
Berry, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Leucadia Financial Corporation (Leucadia)1 appeals a 
summary judgment decree of specific performance requiring it to 
convey real property to respondent (Kelley) pursuant to a sales 
agreement. The lower court reserved Kelley's damages as an 
issue to be tried, but the parties settled that issue out of 
court prior to the appeal. We reverse. 
The issues we must decide are (1) whether the parties1 
sales agreement provides remedies to Kelley if Leucadia is 
unable to convey marketable title, and (2) whether those 
remedies require conveyance by Leucadia if title is not 
marketable. 
1. During the proceedings below, Leucadia succeeded to the 
interest of the original seller, First Security Mortgage 
Company. For simplicity, we will refer to Leucadia as the 
seller. 
The property contemplated by the parties in their sales 
agreement was not surveyed until after the parties executed 
that agreement. The survey revealed that Leucadiafs property 
description did not include certain acreage containing a 
stream, a pond, and a spring, all of which the parties had 
believed to be part of their agreement. Leucadia was unable to 
resolve the land description problem by negotiating with the 
adjoining property owner. Thereafter, Leucadia initiated 
litigation against the adjoining owner and then decided it was 
not worth prosecuting. While Leucadia was trying to clear 
title to the disputed land and water rights, the parties in the 
instant action extended their closing date. Later, each of the 
parties maneuvered to obtain remedies which each believed to 
flow from their contract. 
Leucadia offered to convey title subject to the defects 
or to return Kelley*s earnest money deposit. Kelley tendered a 
portion of the agreed purchase price and insisted that Leucadia 
clear title and then convey the property. Simultaneously, 
Kelley filed suit for (1) a declaratory judgment of the 
parties* rights under the terms of the contract, and (2) 
specific performance pursuant to the contract terms, as 
declared. 
The lower court implicitly interpreted the contract as 
not providing an agreed remedy in the event Leucadia could not 
convey clear and marketable title to all the property. 
Judgment was entered for an equitable remedy, i.e., specific 
performance, with an abatement of the purchase price to 
follow. Thus, the lower court interpreted the parties' 
agreement as a matter of law, not determined by extrinsic 
evidence of intent. We accord that construction no particular 
weight and review the determination under a correctness 
standard. Sfi£ Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is also a 
question of law. Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 
(Utah 1983). We find, as r matter of law, no ambiguity in the 
agreement concerning the rights and remedies of the parties in 
the event title was found to be defective and unmarketable. 
A cardinal principle of contract law is that, in the 
absence of fraud or mutual mistake, a clear and unambiguous 
contract must be enforced according to its terms. Fast v. 
Kahan. 206 Kan. 682, 481 P.2d 958, 961 (1971). The terms of 
the contract, where clear and unambiguous, are conclusive. 
Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co., 101 Ariz. 470, 421 P.2d 318, 320 
(1966). The first source of inquiry is the written document 
itself. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co, v. Salt Lake City 
Coro,, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Thus, we turn 
to the terms to which these parties agreed. 
Leucadia agreed "to furnish good and marketable title to 
the property," subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted in 
the contract. Paragraph G (Title Inspection) of the agreement 
provided a title inspection procedure prior to closing, 
including how the parties would deal with any title defect that 
appeared: "If said defect is not curable through an escrow 
agreement at closing, this agreement shall be null and void at 
the option of the buyer, and all monies received herewith shall 
be returned to the respective parties." Kelley refused to 
accept this option. The parties agreed that title insurance 
would be utilized for closing. Paragraph 4 (Title Insurance) 
of the agreement provided the procedure for insuring title: 
"If title cannot be made insurable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to 
waive such defects and encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and 
this agreement shall thereupon be terminated." Title could not 
be made insurable without exceptions for defects. Kelley 
refused to waive the defects, thus his remedy, as agreed, was 
limited to a refund of his earnest money deposit, not specific 
performance. 
We have examined the other issues argued by the parties, 
including that of tender,2 and conclude they are meritless or 
that they do not require our consideration in light of the 
clear and unambiguous terms of the parties' agreement.3 
2. This court recently discussed the requirement of tender, 
where a purchase agreement contemplates simultaneous 
performance by the parties, in Bell v. Elder. 121 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 16 (Ct. App. 1989), ai. - Carr v. Enoch Smith Co.. 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 89 (Ct. App. 1989). See alsa Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-1 (1987). 
3. In its brief, Leucadia touched on a related issue of 
vandalism, believed to have been committed by the adjoining 
landowner/ which diverted the water and dried up the pond. 
Paragraph P (Risk of Loss) of the parties' agreement provided a 
procedure for dealing with loss or damage to the property prior 
to closing. Kelley did not seek to use that procedure. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case 
is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion* 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
The main opinion reverses this judgment because there is 
no contractual provision allowing for specific performance. If 
Kelley made a proper and timely tender of payment, I believe 
the remedy of specific performance is available. 
My colleagues are correct in limiting the parties' 
remedies at law to the terras of the contract. If there was a 
"defect- in Leucadiafs title, the contract permits Kelley to: 
1) waive the defect and go through with the purchase; or 2) 
take a refund of his earnest money. In this case, Leucadia 
agreed to sell property located at a specific address in Summit 
County. Leucadia had good and marketable title to property 
located at that address. Leucadia erroneously believed and 
represented that the property contained a neighboring stream, 
pond, and spring. That fact should not cloud title to the 
property Leucadia actually owned. There is, therefore, no 
-defect- in Leucadia's titlt,. £aa Black's Law Dictionary 1332 
(5th ed. 1979) (defective title means unmarketable title). 
Clearly, where the contract has not provided a legal remedy, 
the trial court could order specific performance of the 
contract. 
Even where a legal remedy is provided, however, the trial 
court has the discretion to order specific performance of the 
contract if the legal remedy is inadequate. See generally 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357-360 (1981). The rule 
has been long established that a vendee has the right *:c insist 
upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able 
to perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the 
value of the deficiency or defect." Castaono v. Church, 552 
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976); fifie al££ In re Havhurst's Estate, 
478 P.2d 343 (Okla. 1970); Streator v. White, 26 Wash. App. 
430, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). 
I believe the trial court had the discretion to order 
Leucadia to convey the property it owned with an abatement in 
the purchase price. Resolution of this appeal should turn not 
on the unavailability of specific performance as a remedy, but 
on whether Kelley made a proper and timely tender, as argued by 
the parties. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Q o n e r> A r** 
